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Abstract 
 
In May 1982, the British government requisitioned numerous private 
vessels, including the transatlantic liner the RMS Queen Elizabeth 2, 
for use during the Falklands (Malvinas) War.  In taking up ships from 
trade, the rules contained in the 1907 Hague Convention VII relating 
to the conversion of merchant ships into warships afforded some 
guidance to Britain.  This article reviews the development of the use 
made by governments of private ships during wartime, the need for 
Hague Convention VII, and the relevance of that Convention to the 
British requisition exercise undertaken in 1982.   
 
Introduction 
 
Of the many occurrences in 2007, three are of note here:  the 
centenary of the Second Hague Peace Conference,1 the 25th 
anniversary of the Falklands (Malvinas) War (2 April – 25 June 1982),2 
                                              
* Ph.D. and LL.M. (University of Nottingham); J.D. (Fordham 
University); B.A. (Salem College). 
1 See, generally, „The Second Hague Peace Conference:  A Centennial 
Commemoration (1907 – 2007)‟, Netherlands International Law 
Review, Vol. 54 (2007). 
2 The war essentially concerned a long-standing dispute over 
sovereignty of the islands, but its causes are beyond the scope of this 
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and the sale of the former Cunard transatlantic liner, the RMS Queen 
Elizabeth 2 („QE2‟), after 40 years of active passenger service.3   What 
links all three events was the British government‟s requisition in May 
1982 of the QE2 for use in the Falklands War as a troop ship along 
with many other merchant ships taken up from trade (termed „STUFT‟) 
to perform auxiliary duties for Britain during the military campaign in 
the Falklands.4  British sovereign powers of ship requisition are found 
generally within the loosely-defined residual powers of the Crown (the 
„Royal Prerogative‟), currently held by H.R.H. Queen Elizabeth II, and 
known to have been used at least since 1189 during the Third 
Crusade.5  The exercise of the Royal Prerogative is delegated generally 
                                                                                                                                 
discussion.  The Falklands form part of the British Sovereign 
Territories.  Argentina also claims sovereignty, calling them the Islas 
Malvinas.  For a brief account, see, e.g., D.J. Harris, Cases and 
Materials on International Law (London:  Sweet & Maxwell, 3d ed., 
1983), at p. 171.  The controversy is ongoing.  Contrast, e.g., R. 
Dolzer, Territorial Status of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (Dobbs 
Ferry:  Oceana, 1993); G. Pascoe and P. Pepper, „Getting It Right:  the 
Real History of the Falklands/Malvinas:  A Reply to the Argentine 
Seminar of 3 December 2007‟, accessed at 
http://www.falklandshistory.org/gettingitright.pdf. 
3 An investment arm of the Dubai government paid £50 million to 
purchase the ship for use as a floating hotel.   The QE2 was the 
longest-serving ship in the 168-year history of the Cunard line, and 
was the last liner to be launched from the Clyde, in 1967.  See, e.g., J. 
Kollewe and J. Orr, „QE2 heads to luxury retirement home in Dubai‟, 
guardian.co.uk, 18 June 2007. 
4 The STUFT are listed in The Falklands Campaign:  The Lessons 
(London:  Command Paper 8758, 1982), Appendix A:  Tables 4 and 5, 
pp. 39 – 40.  
5 R. Villar, Merchant Ships at War:  the Falklands Experience 
(London:  Conway Maritime, 1984), p. 11.   
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to the government of the day by means of Orders in Council, and is 
utilised, inter alia, for foreign policy and war powers.6   
 
Governments have long made use of private ships during 
wartime, but procedures have varied.  Calls came in 1904 from the 
U.S. President, Theodore Roosevelt, and subsequently in 1906 from 
the Russian Czar, Nicholas II,7 for a Second Hague Peace Conference 
to be convened.  Various maritime issues had by that time become 
pressing for the steadily-increasing number of sovereign states.8  Of 
the thirteen conventions adopted in 1907, eight concerned maritime 
warfare,9 including Hague Convention VII which remains in force.  The 
formal requirements contained in the 1907 Hague Convention VII, for 
the conversion of merchant ships into warships,10 were principally 
                                              
6 See, e.g., H. Barnett, Constitutional and Administrative Law 
(Abingdon:  Routledge-Cavendish, 6th ed., 2006), pp. 115 – 149.  S. 21 
of the 1998 Human Rights Act categorises Orders in Council under 
the Royal Prerogative as primary legislation.   
7 W.I. Hull, The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contributions to 
International Law (New York:  Kraus Reprint Co., 1970; first published 
1908), pp. 4 – 5, and 8 – 9.  See also R. Rosenne, „Introduction‟, in R. 
Rosenne (ed.), The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and 
International Arbitration:  Reports and Documents (The Hague:  
T.M.C. Asser Press, 2001), pp. xiii – xvii.  
8 For example, 26 governments claiming independent sovereignty were 
represented at the 1899 Hague Conference, while 44 of 57 such 
powers attended in 1907.  W.I. Hull, supra note 7, pp. 10, and 15. 
9 Conventions VI to XIII.  See A. Roberts and R. Guelff, Documents on 
the Laws of War (Oxford:  O.U.P., 3d ed., 2000), p. 95.  
10 U.K.T.S. 11 (1910), Command Paper 5115; 205 C.T.S. 319 – 331 
(1907); in force 26 January 1910.  See „International Humanitarian 
Law - Treaties & Documents:  Convention (VII) relating to the 
conversion of merchant ships into warships. The Hague, 18 October 
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intended to abolish privateering once and for all.11  Formal conversion 
also served to distinguish between those ships entitled to use lawful 
military force and those which were not, and thereby to attribute state 
responsibility for infractions of naval warfare.12   
 
The British government turned quickly to private shipping in 
early April 1982 on the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina, 
but mere requisition alone did not convert the STUFT into fully-
commissioned warships.  Requisition therefore raises serious 
questions as to the precise status of the STUFT in terms of the rules of 
armed conflict generally, and of Hague Convention VII, in particular.  
In view of the enduring importance of the merchant marine and its 
trained personnel in modern warfare, the structure of this discussion 
is as follows.  First, a short, general background to the 1907 Hague 
Convention VII is provided, after which subsequent developments are 
outlined.  The requisition procedure utilised by the British government 
to convert the STUFT, and specifically, the QE2, for auxiliary use in 
the Falklands, is then critiqued.  It is concluded that a gap in practice 
between the formalities of Hague Convention VII and mere requisition 
attracted unnecessary risks.  
 
1.  Merchant Ship Conversion in Wartime 
                                                                                                                                 
1907, Explanation‟, accessed at 
www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO?OpenView.  Britain signed Convention 
VII on 18 October 1907, and ratified it on 27 November 1909. 
11 Purportedly accomplished in the 1856 Paris Declaration respecting 
Maritime Law.  See infra notes 17 - 19, and accompanying text.   
12 G. Venturini, „1907 Hague Convention VII relating to the conversion 
of merchant ships into warships – Commentary‟, in N. Ronzitti, ed., 
The Law of Naval Warfare:  A Collection of Agreements and Documents 
with Commentaries (London:  Martinus Nijhoff, l988), pp. 120, 127 n. 
24 (citation omitted).   
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Background to Hague Convention VII 
 
Prior to 1856, states typically turned to privateers on the outbreak of 
war to increase their sea-power rapidly.  Privateers were privately-
owned vessels awarded official commissions (or, letters of marque) by 
a belligerent state.13  The commissioning of privateers entitled such 
ships to use offensive force on the high seas, and thus differentiated 
their acts from acts of piracy.  While privateers were authorised to 
attack all opposing belligerent ships, they generally exercised their 
rights to use force on the high seas to interrupt trade, and to capture 
cargoes and ships as „prize‟.14  Most importantly, the profits from the 
sale of prize were subsequently divided between a belligerent state and 
the privateer, which afforded a private profit motive to public war.   
Privateering was thus profitable, yet costly in legal and diplomatic 
terms as controversial or unlawful seizures of prize could readily be 
perceived as piracy.15  Thus, over time, privateers acquired a 
reputation „as tending to encourage a spirit of lawless depredation‟.16   
 
The lure of private profit did nothing to professionalise warfare, 
and sporadic efforts were made to abolish privateering.  For example, 
                                              
13 J. Westlake, International Law, Part II (War) (Cambridge:  C.U.P., 
1913), p. 177.  Letters of marque derive from the system of reprisals.  
Ibid., pp. 9, 12. 
14 Plunder, effectively, the seizure of which was subject to subsequent 
adjudication in prize courts. 
15 The distinction between piracy and privateering goes to jurisdiction.  
A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford:  O.U.P., 2d ed., 2008), 
p. 12.  See also D.J. Harris, supra note 2, p. 330.  
16 G.G. Wilson (ed.), Wheaton‟s Elements of International Law:  the 
Literal Reproduction of the Edition of 1866 by R.H. Dana, Jr. (Oxford:  
Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 380 n. 173.     
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letters of marque were eschewed mutually by all the belligerents 
during the Crimean War (1853 – 1856),17 the peace terms after which 
included, as the last Act, the four rules of the Declaration of Paris 
Respecting Maritime Law.18  The first rule abolished privateering,19 
which meant that for signatory states privateers could henceforth be 
treated as pirates or war criminals.  Unfortunately, the alternative - 
official merchant ship conversion - had one unforeseen consequence:  
carelessly-converted ships could still be accused of privateering.  
Thus, in 1870, a German Confederation plan to create a volunteer 
fleet for use in the Franco-German War met with objection as a revival 
of privateering.20  The scheme entailed the offer to private ship owners 
                                              
17 Between Russia on the one hand, and Turkey, France, Britain, 
Prussia and Sardinia  on the other.  See, e,g., C.H. Stockton, „The 
Declaration of Paris‟, A.J.I.L., Vol. 14 (1920) 357; H. Wheaton, History 
of the Law of Nations in Europe and America (New York:  Gould, 
Banks and Co., 1845; reprinted 1973), p. 556. 
18 Reprinted in A. Roberts and R. Guelff, Documents on the Laws of 
War (Oxford:  O.U.P., 2d ed., 1989), p. 24.  See also H. Fujita, 
'Commentary:  l856 Paris Declaration, in N. Ronzitti, supra note 12, at 
p.66; H.W. Malkin, „The Inner History of the Declaration of Paris‟, 
B.Y.I.L., Vol. 8 (1927) 1. 
19 The United States of America never formally joined the Declaration 
due to disagreement over the seizure of private property at sea.  Thus, 
privateering remained an option during the U.S. Civil War (1861 – 
1865).  See, e.g., J.B. Moore, History and Digest of the International 
Arbitrations to which the U.S. has been a Party, Vol. 1 (Washington, 
D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 1898), pp. 464, 594 – 595; H. 
Fujita, „Commentary:  1856 Paris Declaration‟, supra note 18, pp. 66, 
70; G.G. Wilson, supra note 16, p. 383. 
20 The war was originally termed the war between France and the 
North German Confederation and the States of Southern Germany 
(Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden and Hessen) owing to the constitutional 
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of ten percent of a ship‟s assessed value up-front in cash as the 
charter price.21  However, the additional offer of a premium of between 
£1500 and £7500 for the capture or destruction of any French 
warship fatally combined public war, private ownership and 
command, and profit.22      
 
The logistics of expanding sea power rapidly in the event of war 
thus continued to vary:  Spain converted merchant ships into 
warships during the Spanish-American War of 1898, while other 
countries chose to co-operate with steamship companies in 
anticipation of future war needs.23  Disagreement concerning the 
proper locale for lawful conversion, and whether a ship could revert 
back to its normal functions prior to war‟s end, made a private ship‟s 
                                                                                                                                 
position at the time.  J.H.W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical 
Perspective:  The Law of Neutrality, Vol. X Part IX-B (Alphen aan den 
Rijn:  Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979), at p. 124.  See also G.A. Craig, 
Germany 1866 – 1945 (Oxford:  O.U.P., 1982), p. 303; A. Roberts and 
R. Guelff, supra note 9, p. 50. 
21 Charters are essentially contracts for the use of a vessel.  See, e.g., 
S. Baughen, Shipping Law (London:  Cavendish Publishing Ltd., 3d 
ed., 2004), pp. 191 – 259.   
22 The plan failed in any event, as private ship owners did not 
respond.  Volunteer navies were often used to avoid accusations of 
privateering.  See H. Lauterpacht, Oppenheim‟s Treatise on 
International Law, Vol. II (Disputes, War and Neutrality) (London:  
Longmans, Green and Co., 7th ed., 1952), pp. 262 – 263; E. Castren, 
The Present Law of War and Neutrality (Helsinki:  Academia 
Scientiarum Fennica, 1954), p. 252; G. Venturini, supra note 12, p. 
120.   
23 H. Lauterpacht, supra note 22, p. 263; E. Castren, supra note 22, 
p. 252. 
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true nature uncertain at any point in time.  Venturini provides the 
following example:  
 
During the Russo-Japanese War (1904 – 1905), two Russian 
ships belonging to the auxiliary navy were authorised by the 
Turkish Sultan to pass through the Bosphorus and the 
Dardanelles as merchant ships.  Then they transited across the 
Suez Canal and were subsequently converted into warships in 
order to exercise the right of visit and search on neutral 
shipping; thereupon they captured a British ship.24 
 
As only belligerent warships had undisputed rights to stop, 
search and capture ships during naval warfare, belligerent merchant 
ships involved in trade or assisting as auxiliaries had no clear right to 
do likewise.  In turn, the treatment of all intercepted ships depended 
on whether they were merely engaged in trade, were acting as enemy 
auxiliaries, or were enemy warships.  Nonetheless, lingering 
uncertainties in practice remained, and formal requirements for 
merchant ship conversion into warships were finally tabled for 
consideration at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. 
 
The Second Hague Peace Conference 
 
A system of mutual disarmament was an important aspiration 
underlying both Peace Conferences convened in The Hague, in 1899 
and 1907, respectively, but that topic was so deeply controversial in a 
world of industrial competition that the Russian government had to 
omit it from the 1907 programme entirely, leaving it as „unfinished 
                                              
24 G. Venturini, supra note 12, p. 120 (ship names and citations 
omitted). 
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business‟.25  The second purpose of each conference - to ensure 
greater humanitarian protections during times of war - succeeded far 
better.  Due in no large part to the extension of the suffrage,26 the 
impetus at the time was to humanise war to the greatest extent 
possible.27  As it had also long been felt that naval practice needed to 
provide for similarly rigorous rules and/or protections as those 
provided for the participants in war on land, maritime warfare formed 
the central focus at The Hague in 1907.   
 
The non-combatant/combatant distinction central to the lawful 
use of armed force both on land and at sea, and hence, central to the 
laws of armed conflict, also reflected a long-standing effort to 
professionalise warfare itself, as evidenced by the adaptation of the 
minimal humanitarian principles of the first Geneva Convention28 in 
1864 to naval warfare on a preliminary basis at the first Hague Peace 
Conference in 1899.29  It was again revised and expanded in 1907 by 
                                              
25 See, e.g., R. Rosenne, supra note 7, pp. xiii – xvii; W.I. Hull, supra 
note 7, pp. 456 - 457. 
26 However, the general participation clause reduced available 
protections, as the conventions only applied if all the belligerents were 
signatories. 
27 See, e.g., the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration renouncing the use, 
in time of war, of explosive projectiles under 400 grammes weight, 58 
B.F.S.P. 16 - 17 (1867 – 1868) (French); 138 C.T.S. 297 – 299 (1868 – 
1869) (French). 
28 1864 Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the 
wounded in armies in the field, 22 August 1864, revised in 1906.   
29 1899 Hague Convention III for the adaptation to maritime warfare of 
the principles of the Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864.  
Additional Articles in 1868 to add naval protections to the 1864 
instrument had been unsuccessful.  Accessed at 
www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/125?OpenDocument.  See also G. 
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Hague Convention X for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the 
principles of the 1906 Geneva Convention.30  Such early efforts to 
protect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the naval 
forces and other persons assimilated to those forces did not however 
regulate the more fundamental entitlement to naval combatant 
status.31  Specifically, as the mere assistance of merchant ships to a 
war effort by no means entitled them automatically to use offensive 
force, precise requirements for official ship conversion (and hence, 
entitlement to the full rights and duties of combatants) needed 
standardisation.   
 
2.  Convention VII 
 
The delegates of 44 states assembled at The Hague in June 1907 were 
divided into six commissions, as well as sub-commissions and 
committees of examination.  The Commission on Maritime Law, 
termed the „IV Commission‟, was not subdivided; the specific remit of 
its 114 members was to discuss any questions concerning maritime 
                                                                                                                                 
Werner, „Les prisonniers de guerre‟, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 21 (1928) 
5, 13 – 14. 
30 Articles 11 and 14 of Hague Convention X extended protection to 
„other persons officially attached to fleets or armies‟ when sick or 
wounded.  Subsequent revision of the 1906 Geneva Convention 
occurred in 1929, and again in the 1949 Geneva Convention II for the 
amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked 
members of armed forces at sea. 
31 Contrast the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV 
respecting the laws and customs of war on land, Articles 4 – 20.  See 
Col. J.E. Edmonds and L. Oppenheim, Land Warfare:  An Exposition 
of the Laws and Usages of War on Land, for the Guidance of Officers 
of His Majesty‟s Army (London:  Harrison and Sons, 1914), Paras. 54 – 
116. 
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warfare not dealt with by the III Commission of War on Sea.32  The 
topic of „merchant ships transformed into cruisers‟, or warships, was 
the first one assigned to the IV Commission, the president of which 
was the Russian delegate, Professor de Martens.33  In fact, no member 
of the IV Commission was opposed to the practice of conversion,34 but 
a central difficulty in standardising procedure was the imperative to 
maintain a fundamental distinction between conversion and 
privateering, as merchant ships engaged in normal commerce could 
have no combatant rights, at least until forced to act in self-defence.35  
Other proposals left open were the types of eligible vessels, the place 
and the required duration of conversion.36 
 
Ultimately, Convention VII on the lawful conversion of merchant 
ships was adopted by the IV Commission, with six abstentions; in the 
plenary session of the Conference, 32 delegates fully approved it.37  
The main stipulations in the Convention were a mere six, each of 
                                              
32 W. I. Hull, supra note 7, p. 32. 
33 See, e.g., V.V. Pustogarov, „Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens (1845-
1909) - a humanist of modern times‟, I.R.R.C., Vol. 312 (1996) 300; 
and „The Martens Clause in International Law‟, J.Hist.Int.L., Vol. 1(2) 
(1999) 125. 
34 W.I. Hull, supra note 7, p. 105.   
35 Which contingency could transform their status.  H. Lauterpacht, 
supra note 22, p. 267, who relies indirectly on Article 8 of the 1907 
Hague Convention XI, and directly on Articles 5 – 7, to base this 
assertion.  See also W.I. Hull, supra note 7, p. 105.  
36 See the Preamble to Convention VII.  See also E. Castren, supra 
note 22, p. 254. 
37 Turkey made a reservation, Nicaragua and Paraguay were absent, 
and nine states (the U.S., Columbia, China, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Persia, Salvador, and Uruguay) abstained.  W.I. 
Hull, supra note 7, p. 108. 
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which went directly to state responsibility inasmuch as they were 
intended to ensure that all those on board converted merchant ships 
respected laws of warfare in exchange for the entitlement to exercise 
the rights and duties of lawful combatants.  Article 1 requires the 
converted ship to be placed „under the direct authority, immediate 
control, and responsibility of the Power whose flag it flies‟.  Article 2 
requires the converted ship to bear the national distinguishing marks 
of a warship.  Article 3 requires the commander to be in the service of 
the state, to be duly commissioned, and to have his name listed 
among fighting fleet officers.  Article 4 requires crew members to be 
subject to military discipline.  Article 5 requires converted ship 
operations to follow the laws and customs of war.  Finally, Article 6 
requires belligerents to announce ship conversion in their official list 
of warships as soon as possible.38     
 
The six rules of Convention VII went some way towards 
affording a more transparent public status to converted merchant 
ships.  Further, by requiring a converted ship to be placed „under the 
direct authority‟, etc., of a belligerent state, the Convention was 
designed to discourage any indirect renewal of privateering.39  
Specifically, any attempt to „depredate‟ could both obviate and incur 
belligerent state obligations to pay compensation, depending on the 
circumstances.40  Standards were even more precise in the relations 
                                              
38 Article 7 contains the „general participation clause‟, standard at the 
time.  See supra note 26.  
39 W.I. Hull, supra note 7, p. 484 n. 1:  the United States neither 
signed nor ratified Convention VII due to its stance regarding the 
capture of private property at sea.  
40 See, e.g., Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention IV.  Cf. E.A. 
Posner and A.O. Sykes, „An Economic Analysis of State and Individual 
Responsibility under International Law‟, Am.L.&Econ.Rev., Vol. 9 
(2007) 72.   
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between belligerent and neutral states.  Under the 1907 Hague 
Convention XIII concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers in 
naval war, enemy merchant ships had to pursue a purely-commercial 
purpose to avoid incurring liability,41 thus underscoring the higher 
obligations owed by belligerents to neutral states than as between 
themselves.  
 
The Non-Combatant/Combatant Status 
 
Hague law now provided rules for recognising the lawful combatant 
rights of fully-converted vessels, including rights of stop, search and 
capture.  Issues left open or otherwise undecided by Convention VII 
however underscored the traditional degree of compromise 
characteristic of naval law, and Castren noted that a greater 
proportion of rules for naval warfare than for war on land remained 
rooted only in customary rules.42  For example, few express standards 
existed for persons caught up in war other than the minimal 
provisions found in the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague 
Convention IV regarding the laws and customs of war on land.  
Accordingly, states retained much flexibility when called upon to 
recognise the public character of converted ships, with concomitant 
consequences for their crews in the event of attack, capture, and/or 
ship destruction.43  As for mere auxiliary ships, i.e., those ships 
neither formally incorporated into the belligerent naval forces nor 
employed on purely commercial matters, the position remained even 
less clear. 
 
                                              
41 Lauterpacht bases this assertion on Convention XIII, Preambular 
Paragraph 4.  H. Lauterpacht, supra note 22, p. 705 n. 4.   
42 E. Castren, supra note 22, p. 244. 
43 See, e.g., H. Lauterpacht, supra note 22, pp. 265 – 266.  See also 
Articles 5 – 8 of Hague Convention XI.  
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As war should only be fought between lawful combatants,44 laws 
of war depend for their effectiveness on status, and long-standing 
distinctions have developed to differentiate between civilians and 
combatants, and between lawful and unlawful combatants.  Thus, „a 
transformed merchant ship [acquired] the rights and privileges of 
warships only when‟ the six rules of Convention VII were observed,45 
and unlawful combatants could be treated as war criminals.  From the 
humanitarian basis of the non-combatant/combatant distinction 
flowed a further Hague rule:  that of proportionality, in that „the right 
of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited‟, 
and unnecessary suffering and damage were to be avoided.46  Only 
that force required to over-power the enemy was permitted,47 but state 
responsibility for infractions of war law remained tightly 
circumscribed, not least on the basis of the „general participation 
clause‟.48 
 
However, and quite apart from the question of arming merchant 
ships for mere defensive purposes, e.g., against pirates,49 if a 
merchant ship utilised force in a public war when its entitlement to do 
so was in doubt, its crew could be treated as unlawful combatants or 
                                              
44 See, e.g., Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, 
Articles 1 and 2, but see also Article 3 (non-combatants may also form 
part of a belligerent‟s armed forces).  
45 Emphasis added.  W.I. Hull, supra note 7, pp. 483 – 484. 
46 Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, Articles 22 
and 23(e).   
47 See the Preamble to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, reprinted 
in A. Roberts and R. Guelff, supra note 9, at p. 54. 
48 E.g., Article 7 of Hague Convention VII. 
49 A practice discontinued after 1856, but revived during World War I.  
See A. Roberts and R. Guelff, supra note 9, p. 169; E. Castren, supra 
note 22, pp. 248 - 252.   
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war criminals.50  The British view was that those on board enemy 
merchant vessels retained their rights of self-defence which, once 
exercised, could transform crew members into legitimate 
combatants,51 but speaking generally, prisoner-of-war treatment 
received minimal attention at The Hague.  Thus, an enemy merchant 
ship using force needed to show evidence it had acted solely in self-
defence.52  If so, the 1907 Hague Convention XI on capture in naval 
warfare provides the following rules: 
 
Article 6.  On giving an undertaking in writing not to engage in any 
service connected with the war, enemy subjects, whether officers or 
crew members, may not be held prisoner;53 
 
Article 7.  The names of all individuals free on parole must be 
notified to the enemy, which is then forbidden to employ them for 
any service prohibited by the terms of parole. 
 
Otherwise, Article 8 removed these protections from „ships taking part 
in the hostilities‟, e.g., the crew of auxiliary ships.  
 
                                              
50 H. Lauterpacht, supra note 22, p. 467.  The term „war crime‟ at the 
time was defined in a military and legal sense as, inter alia, 
illegitimate armed hostilities committed by individuals who were not 
members of the armed forces.  See Col. J.E. Edmonds and L. 
Oppenheim, supra note 31, Paras. 441 – 442. 
51 The German view was that resistance was unlawful.  H. 
Lauterpacht, supra note 22, p. 467. 
52 Ibid., p. 267, reaches this conclusion by analogy with Article 8 of 
Hague Convention XI.  See also ibid., p. 475. 
53 Contrast World War I, when all captured enemy civilians of military 
age were interned.  Ibid., p. 267. 
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In short, the strict contours of Hague Convention VII may have 
helped to „bring all naval combatants within the rules adopted for the 
humanising of warfare‟,54 but the result in combination with other 
Hague rules, was as follows:  first, the officers and crew of enemy 
warships were to be treated as lawful combatants; secondly, those 
serving on enemy merchant ships which employed force in self-
defence might be treated as lawful combatants.  As for unincorporated 
enemy auxiliaries vessels deemed to have employed offensive force 
without lawful authority, no special protections existed.55  It was 
expected that gaps in coverage would be filled by reference to custom 
and accepted military usage.   
 
3.  Subsequent developments 
 
Up to World War II 
 
A subsequent attempt to clarify certain peripheral issues was made in 
1908 at the London Naval Conference.  The Declaration of London 
concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare56 was signed on 26 February 
                                              
54 Emphasis added.  W.I. Hull, supra note 7, p. 484. 
55 Those ships immune from attack at the time included hospital 
ships, 1899 Hague Convention III, 1907 Hague Convention X; small 
coastal and fishing boats, and scientific ships, 1907 Hague 
Convention XI; and cartel ships (e.g., for the exchange of prisoners).  
See J. Westlake, supra note 13, p. 162.  See also Article 47 of the 
1913 Oxford Manual on the Laws of Naval War. 
56 Reprinted in D. Schindler and J. Toman (eds.), The Laws of Armed 
Conflict (Leiden:  Sijthoff, 1973), p. 625; A.J.I.L., Vol. 3 (Suppl. 1909) 
179.  See, e.g., F. Kalshoven, „Commentary:  1909 London 
Declaration‟, in N. Ronzitti, supra note 12, p. 257. 
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1909, and constituted the successor to Hague Convention XII.57  
Intended to resolve various controversies which had impacted on 
Hague Convention VII, such as the right to stop and search at sea, the 
Declaration did largely confirm the customary law of the time 
regarding, inter alia, the determination of enemy character, but the 
Declaration remained unratified.  Other maritime issues, in terms of 
the guidance available in World War I,58 had to await the 1913 Oxford 
Manual adopted by the Institute of International Law on 9 August 
1913.59  A non-binding code of practice, the Oxford Manual of the 
Laws of Naval War,60 together with the 1909 London Declaration, 
provides an accurate, if incomplete, account of the pre-World War I 
customary law of sea warfare.   
 
The formalities of Hague Convention VII for converted merchant 
ships are found in Articles 3 to 8 of the Oxford Manual, but in relation 
to the place of conversion, a matter left unresolved in 1907, Article 9 
specified that 
 
                                              
57 Relative to the creation of an international prize court (never in 
force).  
58 See, e.g., E. Chadwick, „The “Impossibility” of Maritime Neutrality 
During World War 1‟, in supra note 1, at p. 337. 
59 The Institute was established in Belgium in 1873 by eminent jurists 
including Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, Tobias Asser, and K. 
Bluntschli, and was highly influential in the progressive development 
of international law.  The Institute also adopted the 1880 Oxford 
Manual of the Laws and Customs of War on Land. 
60 Reprinted in D. Schindler and J. Toman (eds.), The Laws of Armed 
Conflicts (The Hague:  Martinus Nijhoff, 2d ed., 1988), pp. 858 - 875.  
See, e.g., P. Verri, „Commentary:  1913 Oxford Manual‟, in N. Ronzitti, 
supra note 12, p. 329.   
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The conversion of a vessel into a warship may be accomplished 
by a belligerent only in its own waters, in those of an allied state 
also a belligerent, in those of the adversary, or, lastly, in those 
of a territory occupied by the troops of one of these states. 
 
Thus, lawful conversion could not occur on the high seas, or in 
neutral or other non-aligned state waters.  Article 10 prohibited the 
re-conversion of a warship back into a public or private vessel for the 
duration of the hostilities.  Article 12 reiterated the prohibition of 
privateering, and specified the following parameters for the use of 
offensive force: 
 
Apart from the conditions laid down …, neither public nor 
private vessels, nor their personnel, may commit acts of hostility 
against the enemy.  Both may, however, use force to defend 
themselves against the attack of an enemy vessel.61 
 
For those found to have assisted the hostilities unlawfully, the 
following provisions were made: 
 
Article 60. When a public or a private ship has directly or 
indirectly taken part in the hostilities, the enemy may retain as 
prisoners of war the whole personnel of the ship, without 
prejudice to the penalties he might otherwise incur. 
 
Article 61. Members of the personnel of a public or of a private 
vessel, who are personally guilty of an act of hostility towards 
the enemy, may be held by him as prisoners of war, without 
prejudice to the penalties he might otherwise incur. 
 
                                              
61 Cf. Article 8 of Hague Convention XI. 
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Already, release on parole had become discretionary, but in a 
provision analogous to Hague Convention IV Article 3, imprisonment 
was „without prejudice to‟ an obligation to pay compensation „if the 
case demands‟.62   
 
Unfortunately, the perfidious means and methods of warfare 
adopted in World War I illustrated more the urge to employ 
industrialised weaponry than respect for rules designed to make 
warfare more humane.  Afterwards, attempts to supplement and 
update the rules of armed conflict proved unpopular and largely 
unsuccessful,63 notable exceptions being the 1936 London Proces-
Verbal,64 and the 1929 Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of 
prisoners of war but ratified only by 39 states when war broke out 
again in 1939.  As for belligerent use of private ships during World 
War II, Castren noted that „conversions and re-conversions [were] 
carried out on a large scale … although all states have not recognised 
these measures‟.65      
 
Post-1945 
 
A central concern of the United Nations since World War II has been 
to restrain the use of force in international relations.66   Such restraint 
has required an expanding body of laws intended both to ensure 
                                              
62 Section IX „Additional Article‟.  
63 E.g., the 1922 Washington Treaty relating to the use of submarines 
and noxious gases in warfare.  The 1930 International Treaty for the 
limitation and reduction of naval armaments expired on 31 December 
1936.  A. Roberts and R. Guelff, supra note 9, p. 169. 
64 Part IV of the 1930 Treaty of London, and extending to submarines 
the rules applicable to warships.  U.K.T.S. 29 (1936).   
65 E. Castren, supra note 22, p. 255. 
66 See, e.g., U.N. Charter Article 2(4). 
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peace and to broaden humanitarian respect in the event of an armed 
conflict.67  The Geneva Conventions were revised and supplemented in 
1949, and the general participation clause in common article 2(3) 
made humanitarian obligations a matter of unilateral state obligation 
rather than of mutual reciprocity.  Prisoner-of-war status was 
extended, inter alia, to members of regular armed forces professing 
allegiance to a government not recognised by the detaining power, and 
to the crew of the merchant marine „who do not benefit by more 
favourable treatment under any other provisions of international 
law‟;68 equivalent treatment was extended to those whose status was 
yet to be determined by a competent tribunal.69  Civilians for the first 
time were made the subject of a Geneva Convention, in the new 
Convention IV.70   
 
The 1977 Protocol 1 additional to the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, and relating to the protection of victims of international 
armed conflicts,71 again extended combatant eligibility in recognition 
of new forms of warfare.  It required the armed forces to be organised 
                                              
67 On the issue of legal prioritisation, see, e.g., W. Heintschel von 
Heinegg, „The Current State of International Prize Law‟, in H.H.G. Post 
(ed.), International Economic Law and Armed Conflict (Dordrecht:  
Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), pp. 5, 21 – 25. 
68 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners-
of-War, Article 4. 
69 1949 Geneva Convention III, Article 5.  Prisoner-of-war treatment is 
distinct from prisoner-of-war status.   
70 Relative to the protection of civilians.   
71 U.K.T.S. 29 (1999); 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1979).  See, e.g., M. Bothe, 
„Commentary:  1977 Geneva Protocol l‟, in N. Ronzitti, supra note 12, 
p. 760. 
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under responsible command, to comply with international rules of 
armed conflict,72 and to 
 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they 
are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory 
to an attack. [Where that is impossible], he shall retain his 
status as a combatant provided that, in such situations, he 
carries his arms openly: 
 (a) during each military engagement,  
and 
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while 
he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the 
launching of an attack in which he is to participate.73 
 
In turn, the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status was listed 
as an example of perfidy.74  Also for the first time, lawful military 
objectives were specified.  Article 52(2) permitted attack only on those 
objects which, on the facts, can be justified as they „make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage‟.  As for proportionality in attack,75 
Protocol 1, Article 85(3), made the wilful targeting of civilians or their 
objects a grave breach.   
 
The accession of Argentina to Protocol 1, on 26 November 1986, 
post-dated war in the Falklands.  Britain, too, had only signed the 
                                              
72 1977 Protocol 1, Articles 43(1) and 44(2). 
73 1977 Protocol 1, Article 44(3). 
74 1977 Protocol 1, Article 37(1)(c).  Perfidy is defined as an act 
„inviting the confidence of an adversary … with intent to betray that 
confidence‟.  Article 37(1). 
75 See also Articles 35(2), 51(5)(b), 56, 57(2)(a)(iii), and 57(2)(b). 
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Protocol,76 but its 1977 signature at least obliged it not to act contrary 
to the Protocol‟s „object and purpose‟.77  Thus, in 1982, nowhere in 
treaty provision had it been stated that the general principles 
applicable in armed conflict on land were also relevant to the conduct 
of hostilities at sea.  Further, most legal rules in force concerning the 
formalities and conduct of maritime hostilities still dated from the 
Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, including those contained in 
Hague Convention VII, as is now discussed in the context of the 1982 
Falklands War, British ship requisition, and the use made during that 
conflict of the QE2. 
 
4.  The Falklands War 
 
Brief Background 
 
The Falkland Islands are located 8000 miles south-west of Britain, 
3500 miles from Ascension Island, but only 400 miles from the coast 
of Argentina.78  Concern about an imminent invasion of the Falklands 
by Argentina had been raised by British intelligence for many weeks 
before it occurred,79 and particularly after Argentine „scrap metal 
merchants landed illegally in the tiny port of Leith, South Georgian, 
                                              
76 On 19 July 1995, the U.K. Geneva Conventions (Amendments) Act 
1995 (c. 27) to implement the Additional Geneva Protocols 1 and 2 
received the Royal Assent. 
77 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 18.  Britain 
signed the Protocol on 12 December 1977 on the basis of 10 
„understandings‟; at ratification on 28 January 1998, it made 16 
„statements‟.   
78 The Falklands Campaign, supra note 4, Para. 107.   
79 „A Brief History of the Falkland Islands, Part 7:  The 1982 War and 
Beyond‟, Falkland Islands Information Web, accessed at 
www.falklands.info/history/history/7.html.   
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and hoisted the Argentine flag‟ on 19 March 1982.80  A first planning 
meeting was held at the Ministry of Defence on 31 March,81 when it 
was pointed out that temporary powers of requisition taken under the 
Royal Prerogative would be necessary to acquire certain ships deemed 
essential for British defence.82  The Royal Fleet Auxiliary was also 
available for deployment.83  Although the entire R.F.A. fleet was 
brought „into commission for the first time in its history‟ during the 
campaign,84 more ships were needed for the supply of fuel, food, 
stores and ammunition to warships, aviation and amphibious 
support, and for troop transport,85 all of which tasks made them 
legitimate objects of Argentine attack.   
 
Actual hostilities began on 2 April 1982 and escalated quickly, 
as each belligerent claimed an entitlement to use force in self-
defence.86  A 200-mile exclusion zone imposed by Britain on 12 April 
                                              
80 Provoking a diplomatic protest from Britain.  See 
www.teamportsmouth.com/Mem-DaveHutchings.html.  A similar 
incident on 9 January 1981 had also led to a formal protest.  „1982 
Falklands War Timeline:  Chronology‟, accessed at 
www.falklands.info/history/82timeline.html. 
81 R. Villar, supra note 5, p. 11. 
82 The Falklands Campaign, supra note 4, Para. 306 (military 
expenditure capped at 3% above inflation). 
83 The R.F.A. is owned by the Ministry of Defence, and dates back 
essentially to Elizabethan times.  It was granted a Royal Charter in 
1911.  See R. Villar, supra note 5, p. 145. 
84 Ibid., p. 154, and generally, pp. 145 – 160. 
85 See „Falkland Islands:  keeping the supply line filled‟, The 
Economist, 1 May 1982, p. 28. 
86 See, e.g., S. Gul, „The Bells of Hell:  an Assessment of the Sinking of 
ANR General Belgrano in the Context of the Falklands Conflict‟, 
N.Y.I.L.Rev., Vol. 18 (2005) 81, at 84 - 91.  For an overview of United 
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around the Falklands against Argentine naval ships was subsequently 
extended on 30 April to exclude all ships and aircraft of any country, 
whether commercial or military.87  From 7 May, any Argentine 
warship or military aircraft over 12 miles from the Argentine coast was 
deemed hostile.88  Britain mobilised civilian resources on an 
emergency basis, including the requisition of merchant ships.89  
Necessary modifications to the STUFT required as few as two or three 
days,90 and somewhat longer in some cases.91  Within seven weeks, a 
task force of 28000 men and over 100 ships in total had been 
assembled, and sent to the Falklands.92   
 
The conflict between Argentina and Britain over the islands was 
the first major naval belligerent operation since 1945, but the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and Protocol 1 did not generally regulate the 
conduct of purely naval hostilities such as „attacks by naval forces on 
                                                                                                                                 
Nations activity during the war, see, e.g., D.J. Harris, supra note 2, 
pp. 661 – 667.  
87 See „Invasion:  best guesses‟, The Economist, 1 May 1982, p. 26. 
88 The Falklands Campaign, supra note 4, Paras. 103 – 104.  An 
Argentine 200-mile exclusion zone was declared on 30 April.  „Mayday 
in the South Atlantic, The Economist, 8 May 1982, pp. 25, 26. 
89 See generally The Economist, 24 April 1982, p. 6, 22 May, p. 25, 
and 12 June, pp. 29 and 31.     
90 E.g., the P & O Roll-on Roll-off general cargo ship, the MV Elk 
(taken up 4 April, modified 6 – 9 April in Southampton).  R. Villar, 
supra note 5, Appendix I, p. 169. 
91 E.g., the QE2 (taken up 4 May, modified 4 – 12 May in 
Southampton).  Ibid., Appendix I, p. 170. 
92 The Falklands Campaign, supra note 4, Para. 108. 
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objects, in particular vessels and aircraft, at sea‟.93  As the STUFT 
eventually outnumbered the British warships sent to the Falklands,94 
and as warships remain distinct from mere auxiliaries both legally 
and militarily,95 Hague Convention VII on the conversion of merchant 
ships into warships was relevant to the British requisition exercise 
only to the extent that Britain complied with Convention formalities.  
If not, even when considered in light of the additional details on 
conversion practice provided in the unofficial 1913 Oxford Manual, it 
must be queried what if any additional precautions Britain needed to 
consider in order to safeguard the requisitioned ships from 
indiscriminate attack, as is now discussed. 
 
Requisition Procedure 
 
Two days after Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, the decision 
by the British government to utilise the Royal Prerogative to 
requisition ships was given effect by the Requisitioning of Ships Order 
in Council of 4 April 1982, the scope of which was extensive.96  The 
Order delegated the power of requisition, in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
                                              
93 L. Doswald-Beck, „San Remo Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 12 June 1994‟ [1995] 309 
I.R.R.C. 583.  
94 R. Villar, supra note 5, p. 15. 
95 A point made by G. Venturini, supra note 12, p. 125. 
96 Requisitioning of Ships Order in Council, 4 April 1982 (Statutory 
Instrument No. 1982, p. 1693), reproduced along with a sample notice 
of requisition in R. Villar, supra note 5, pp. 8 – 10.  Orders in Council 
may be legislative, executive or judicial, and give effect to decisions 
made under the Royal Prerogative and under statute.  H. Barnett, 
supra note 6, p. 265. 
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2.  A Secretary of State or the Minister of Transport (…) or the 
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may requisition for Her 
Majesty‟s service any British ship and anything on board such 
ship wherever the ship may be. 
 
The term „requisition‟ was defined by the Order as meaning to „take 
possession of the ship or thing or require the ship or thing to be 
placed at the disposal of the requisitioning authority‟.97  Ships subject 
to requisition included those registered in the U.K., and in „any 
country outside Her Majesty‟s dominions in which Her Majesty has 
jurisdiction in right of the Government of the U.K‟.98  The requisition 
exercise, codenamed „Operation Corporate‟, thus entailed the 
immediate (and frequently unexpected) government use of privately-
owned ships.  
 
As is evident from the Order, there was neither any mention of 
Hague Convention VII formalities, nor of additional guidelines such as 
those found in Articles 9 and 10 of the Oxford Manual.  However, to 
the extent that Hague Convention VII was intended to draw a bright 
line between publicly-accountable military service and private activity, 
the Convention formalities were clearly evident from the start of the 
requisition exercise.  For example, there is no doubt that British 
requisition duly authorised the STUFT to participate in a public war.  
Governmental financial liability was quickly evident as provision was 
made „from the outset to maintain the cash flow of owners whose 
ships were taken up‟.99  Requisitioning was cheaper in that the 
                                              
97 Requisitioning of Ships Order in Council, 4 April 1982, supra note 
96, Article 5(2). 
98 Ibid., Article 5(3). 
99 See the Compensation (Defence) Act 1939 (ch. 75), ss. 1(b), 4, and 
10, which Villar, supra note 5, p. 19, characterises as „not altogether 
satisfactory‟, having been designed for total war.  Ultimately, 
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government only covered the companies‟ operating costs,100 while 
chartered vessels, several of which were oil tankers, were paid for at 
commercial rates.  However, insurance cover from the British War 
Risk Clubs was quickly unobtainable.101   
 
The STUFT were manned generally by volunteer civilian crews 
and supplemented by small naval or R.F.A. parties.102  A Declaration 
of Active Service placed everyone on board under the jurisdiction of 
the 1957 Naval Discipline Act,103 and thus subject to military 
discipline (Hague Convention VII, Article 4).  However, while positive 
obligations to follow the laws and customs of war (Article 5) were 
imposed, the requisition exercise alone did not extend combatant 
rights to the STUFT.  The vessels were not placed under the direct 
authority of fully-commissioned commanders (Article 3), but did 
remain under overall British military authority and control (Article 
                                                                                                                                 
guidelines on compensation were announced.  Fees by mid-May for 
the 51 ships requisitioned or chartered amounted to £30 million.  
„Cost to Britain:  the price for the job‟, The Economist, 15 May 1982, 
p. 30. 
100 „The fuel-guzzling QE2 cost $125,000 a day to run, but cargo ships 
cost less.‟  „Requisitioning:  England expects …‟, The Economist, 8 
May 1982, p. 36. 
101 R. Villar, supra note 5, pp. 11, 19.  For the modern position, see 
the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (ch. 21), Part VII (liability of ship 
owners and others:  application to Crown and its ships) s. 192A 
(compulsory insurance or security). 
102 The Falklands Campaign, supra note 4, Para. 246. 
103 R. Villar, supra note 5, p. 15.  See the Naval Discipline Act 1957 
(ch. 53), ss. 111 (naval forces, volunteers and trainees), and 132 
(definitions of Her Majesty‟s ships, forces, etc.). 
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1).104  As for structural challenges, necessary modifications included 
the fitting of temporary flight decks (constructed over swimming pools 
in the case of some liners),105 the equipping of trawlers as 
minesweepers, and the provision of additional communication, 
navigation and cryptographic equipment.106  Defensive capability was 
acquired to protect against lawful means of attack,107 such as by 
ramming, use of torpedoes, and by air,108 but there was no express 
provision for „distinguishing marks‟ (Article 2).  
 
The involvement of the R.F.A. made the situation rather more 
complicated.  The R.F.A. is comprised of public merchant ships owned 
by the Ministry of Defence; its personnel are certificated Merchant 
Navy officers and civilians with substantial naval training for use in 
an operational environment.  It provides naval auxiliary services when 
called upon to do so, but there is little question of „warships‟ and it is 
not a permanent part of the armed forces.109  Its separate status is 
signalled by the Blue Ensign, rather than the White Ensign of the 
Royal Navy.  Thus, the few STUFT fully-commissioned in 1982 would 
have displayed the White Ensign; any taken into Ministry of Defence 
ownership would have displayed the Blue Ensign.  All three British 
                                              
104 Commander-in-Chief, Fleet, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, had 
overall responsibility for Operation Corporate. 
105 R. Villar, supra note 5, pp. 20 - 21. 
106 The Falklands Campaign, supra note 4, Para. 247. 
107 See G. Venturini, supra note 12, p. 125. 
108 The STUFT relied typically on the weaponry carried by troops.  R. 
Villar, supra note 5, p. 163. 
109 See Royal Fleet Auxilliary, „Basic Facts:  Command‟, accessed at 
www.royal-navy.mod.uk/server/show/nav.5860; „The Royal Fleet 
Auxiliary in the South Atlantic‟, accessed at www.britains-
smallwars.com/Falklands/rfa.htm.  The Ministry of Defence is its own 
insurer.  
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ensigns (White, Blue, and Red for ordinary shipping) are „ensigns of 
Her Majesty‟s Fleet‟,110 but as this domestic arrangement is not 
binding on other states, a „quite delicate‟ situation is created for 
„states whose regulations do not provide for a distinction between the 
ensigns of the navy and the merchant marine‟.111   
 
Requisition of the QE2   
 
Effected six weeks after the Argentine flag appeared in Leith, South 
Georgia,112 the QE2 was requisitioned on 3 May 1982 on its return to 
England from New York and Philadelphia.  Requisition apparently 
came as a surprise to its owners,113 even though the ship was 
„requisitioned under a previous contract rather than chartered‟.114  
The operative paragraph of the message received both by the vessel 
and its owners stated „Your vessel Queen Elizabeth 2 is requisitioned 
by the Secretary of State for Trade under the Requisitioning of Ships 
Order 1982 and you are accordingly required to place her at his 
disposal forthwith‟.115  All future cruises were cancelled, and the QE2 
                                              
110 Capt. Malcolm Farrow, O.B.E., R.N., President of the British Flag 
Institute, very kindly supplied these distinctions by emails dated 10 
and 11 September 2008.  He also noted that „those few STUFT 
(trawlers) that were commissioned wore the White Ensign … all other 
civilian ships retained their civilian ensigns‟. 
111 G. Venturini, supra note 12, p. 126 n. 8.   
112 See www.teamportsmouth, supra note 80. 
113 See, e.g., C. Thatcher (with E. Flounders and M. Gallagher), QE2:  
Forty Years Famous (London:  Simon and Schuster, 2007), p. 157. 
114 Email from the Royal Naval Museum, 15 October 2007.  No 
verification of this point has been forthcoming from Cunard. 
115 Quoted in C. Thatcher, supra note 113, p. 157.    
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proceeded immediately to Southampton docks for modification as a 
troop and supply vessel.116   
 
The ship was fitted with two helipads, after large parts of the 
superstructure were sliced away.  It received refuelling-at-sea gear for 
fuel and water supplies, and additional communications equipment.  
Accommodation was increased by 1000 camp beds to carry 3150 
service personnel from 5 Infantry Brigade,117 and it was loaded with 
large quantities of stores totalling 71 tons.  Defensive protection, e.g., 
against magnetic mines, was supplied.  Captain Peter Jackson was 
placed in command,118 but he, unlike most Cunard officers, was not 
in the Royal Navy Reserve, and the liner continued to display the Red 
Ensign of the Merchant Service to signify its non-combatant status.  
Some 650 of the QE2‟s crew volunteered for the Falklands trip,119 
including its First Officer, an R.N.R. Lieutenant requested to travel 
south as the ship‟s liaison officer,120 and Naval Party 1980.121  The 
                                              
116 See www.teamportsmouth, supra note 80.  
117 Comprising the Scots Guards, the Welsh Guards and the 7th 
Gurkha Rifles.  C. Thatcher, supra note 113, p. 159.  Nepalese 
Gurkhas swear an oath to the Queen, so are not considered 
mercenaries.  „It‟s a long way to Paklihawa‟, The Economist, 12 June 
1982, p. 30.  See 1977 Protocol 1, Article 47.  
118 Having met with Cunard officials, representatives from the Ministry 
of Defence and Department of Trade, Lloyds insurers, and Royal Naval 
and military personnel on 4 May.  www.teamportsmouth, supra note 
80. 
119 R. Villar, supra note 5, Appendix 2, p. 173; C. Thatcher, supra 
note 113, pp. 158 – 159.  See also www.teamportsmouth, supra note 
80.  Merchant seaman‟s pay received a premium of 150%.  „Cost to 
Britain‟, supra note 99.  
120 See www.teamportsmouth, supra note 80.  
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ship‟s departure from Southampton for the Falklands was widely 
publicised by British and European mass media.122 
 
As war between belligerents can be waged anywhere on the high 
seas, the QE2 was vulnerable to attack throughout the journey.  By 
continuing to fly the Red Ensign to signal what it considered to be its 
non-combatant status, the QE2 should in theory have invited less 
curiosity, but the public nature of its departure from Southampton 
and its assigned duties as a troop ship made it an important 
Argentine military objective.  Allegedly, Argentina employed a Boeing 
707 to search for it in the South Atlantic.123  To better conceal its 
identity, the QE2‟s windows were blacked-out after departing 
Ascension (roughly, the half-way point).124  The liner had brushes with 
extreme danger, including acutely-low visibility due to fog; as it neared 
the war zone, its radar was switched off and it navigated massive 
iceberg fields in the vicinity of South Georgia without it, where it 
offloaded troops onto other vessels on 28 May.  The following day, the 
                                                                                                                                 
121 A Naval Party travelled on board each STUFT.  Headquarters Land 
Forces, Falklands Islands, and Captain (acting) N.C.H. James of the 
Royal Navy boarded the QE2 on 12 May, but Captain Jackson 
remained in overall command of the ship.   
122 See www.teamportsmouth, supra note 80.  See also B.B.C. film 
coverage of 12 May 1982, of the ship‟s departure from Southampton 
displaying the Red Ensign:  „A Queen Goes to War (1982)‟, accessed at 
www.bbc.co.uk/hampshire/content/articles/2007/06/19/qe2_featur
e.shtml.   
123 R. Villar, supra note 5, pp. 48 – 49.  See also C. Thatcher, supra 
note 113, pp. 160 – 161. 
124 Encrypted radio communications with Britain were relayed via the 
American communications centre on Ascension.  „Falkland Islands:  
keeping the supply line filled‟, supra note 85. 
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ship turned back towards Britain, carrying nearly 700 survivors,125 
and arrived back on 11 June.  On 25 June, the campaign was 
effectively over.126  The QE2 resumed normal cruising service on 15 
August 1982.127   
 
Critique 
 
To what extent were the formalities of Hague Convention VII relevant 
to the QE2‟s requisition, and to what extent did both belligerents 
encounter difficulties in terms of the wider aspects of Hague and 
Geneva rules?  As noted above, the STUFT were subject to military 
discipline but were not all placed under direct military command.  
Moreover, there was no express provision for „distinguishing marks‟ 
(Hague Convention VII, Article 2).  Such omissions then implicate the 
long-standing non-combatant/combatant distinction,128 particularly 
as it was speculated at the time that, rather than target the Royal 
Navy, Argentina would have done better to husband its air force „for 
use against the support ships which enabled the task force to stay in 
place‟.129  Indeed, few specific rules concerning attack on military 
                                              
125 C. Thatcher, supra note 113, p. 161. 
126 The Defence Ministry‟s annual White Paper published 22 June 
1982 made no mention of the war.  „Wot, no Falklands?‟, The 
Economist, 26 June 1982, p. 25. 
127 Re-conversion cost £7 million, of which the government paid £2 
million.  The rest was accounted for by Cunard improvements.  C. 
Thatcher, supra note 113, p. 163. 
128 See, e.g., Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, 
Article 1(2). 
129 „Falkland Islands:  the noose round Port Stanley‟, The Economist, 5 
June 1982, p. 21. 
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objectives were yet in force,130 and even those in existence were based 
more on a general prohibition of indiscriminate attack, yet it was 
already clear by 1982 that any military gains to be achieved from 
particular operations needed to be obtained both lawfully and 
discriminately.   
 
Accordingly, not only must it appear necessary to attack a 
military objective, but the consequences of attack should be limited 
by, or proportional to, the value of the objective, taking into account 
any foreseeable civilian loss or other damage.131  The 1977 Geneva 
Protocol 1 was even more specific.  Article 52 provided that civilian 
objects „shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals‟ unless they 
constituted military objectives; military objectives were then limited to 
those objects which „make an effective contribution to military action‟, 
the destruction, capture or neutralisation of which „offers a definite 
military advantage‟.132  Thus, the QE2, when acting as a troop ship 
under official requisition, was a legitimate Argentine military objective 
for attack.  Even had it been engaged on its normal business, it might 
still have constituted a legitimate military objective, if to do so would 
have made „an effective contribution to [Argentine] military action‟. 
                                              
130 Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, Article 27 
and Hague Convention IX, Article 5 (protection of civilian objects); 
1949 Geneva Convention I, Article 19(2), and Convention IV, Article 
18(4) (hospitals and medical units). 
131 See, e.g., the United States Naval Handbook [1995] s. 8.1.2.1, and 
s. 9.1.2:  „provided such casualties are not foreseeably excessive in 
light of the expected military advantage to be gained‟, quoted in J.-M. 
Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Vol. II:  Practice, Pt. 1‟ (C.U.P., 2005), at Ch. 4, 
Para. 48, p. 305. 
132 Article 52 already constituted customary international law, 
arguably, due to other post-1945 developments in international law. 
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Obviously, an evaluation of „effective contribution‟ can be 
somewhat speculative, which then leads to an additional difficulty.  
Flying the enemy flag provides ready evidence of national character, 
and the regulations of many third states do not allow for distinctions 
to be made between the domestic ensigns of enemy ships.133  As 
collateral damage should also be considered prior to attack on a 
military objective, it is useful to consider what options exist other than 
attack.  For example, the traditional rights of belligerent visit and 
search at sea, the procedures for which arose from the prize laws of 
former times, still influence naval decision-making.  The QE2 lacked 
offensive capabilities, so outright attack could have been deemed 
excessive, making capture more proportional, but as the ship carried 
troops,134 destruction would certainly have offered Argentina a definite 
military advantage.  Further, by aiding the hostilities, the civilians 
crewing the QE2 could have been regarded as combatants, a view 
reflected in customary humanitarian rules at the time,135 but 
                                              
133 G. Venturini, supra note 12, p. 126 n. 8.   
134 Including Major General Sir John Jeremy Moore, commander 
(designate) of the British land forces for the Falklands, who joined the 
QE2 from Ascension.  General Moore received the Argentine surrender 
on 14 June.  See G. Smith, Battle Atlas of the Falklands War 1982, by 
Land, Sea and Air (Lulu.com, 2006, and based on Battles of the 
Falklands War (Ian Allan, 1989)), accessed at www.naval-
history.net/F37weekseven.htm. 
135 See, e.g., the 1989 United States memorandum of law concerning 
the prohibition of assassination:  „there is general agreement among 
law-of-war experts that civilians who participate in hostilities may be 
regarded as combatants‟, quoted in J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-
Beck (eds.), supra note 131, at Ch. 1, Para. 805, p. 112 (citation 
omitted). 
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combatant status requires „a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a 
distance‟.136  
 
It is thus the QE2‟s continued display of the „non-combatant‟ 
Red Ensign of the Merchant Service that raises concern.  At the time 
of accession to Protocol 1 in 1986, Argentina registered 
„interpretations‟ for Protocol 1, Article 44 („Combatants and Prisoners-
of-War‟).137  Specifically, Argentina rejected any interpretation  
 
(a) as conferring on persons who violate the rules … any kind of 
immunity exempting them from the system of sanctions 
which apply to each case; 
(b) as specifically favouring anyone who violates the rules the 
aim of which is the distinction between combatants and the 
civilian population; 
(c) as weakening respect for the fundamental principle of the 
international law of war which requires that a distinction be 
made between combatants and the civilian population, with 
the prime purpose of protecting the latter.138 
 
Further, Protocol 1, Article 39(3), provided that the Protocol‟s 
rules applicable to perfidy or the use of flags in the conduct of armed 
conflict at sea „shall not affect the existing generally-recognised rules 
                                              
136 1949 Geneva Convention II, Article 13(2)(b). 
137 Combatants who do not comply with the principle of distinction 
forfeit their right to be prisoners-of-war, but Article 44(4) extends 
equivalent protections.  
138 Quoted in A. Roberts and R. Guelff (3d), supra note 9, pp. 499 – 
500.  „Civilian‟ is defined in Article 50 of Protocol 1 as those persons 
not falling within the terms of Article 4A(1)(2)(3) and (6) of the Third 
Geneva Convention of 1949, and of Article 43 of Protocol 1. 
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of international law‟,139 but given the absence by Argentina of any 
further qualification made along those lines, it becomes arguable that 
the Argentine „interpretations‟ of Protocol 1, Article 44, were intended 
to be applicable both on land and at sea.  Moreover, the feigning of 
civilian, non-combatant status - an act of „perfidy‟140 - is condemned 
both in Argentina‟s Law of War Manual,141 and in Britain‟s Law of 
Armed Conflicts,142 and perfidious behaviour can be tried and 
punished as a war crime.143  Thus, while it could be argued equally 
that the QE2 was justified in displaying its chosen form of self-
identification, in that it had not been converted into a warship in full 
compliance with Hague Convention VII,144 it would appear that its 
civilian command and volunteer crew were carelessly endangered as 
there is little to indicate that Argentina would have felt under any 
special obligation to consider the alternatives to outright attack.     
 
5.  Further Developments 
 
In view of practices adopted in modern naval confrontations, the San 
Remo Manual was produced by the International Institute of 
                                              
139 See, e.g., E. Chadwick, supra note 58, at pp. 338, 356 – 358 
(discussion of Q-ships and the Baralong incident of August 1915). 
140 Protocol 1, Article 37, was adopted by consensus.  Diplomatic 
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law („CDDH‟), Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.39, 
25 May 1977, p. 103. 
141 Argentina, Law of War Manual [1989], s. 1.05(2)(3).   
142 U.K., Law of Armed Conflicts [1981], Section 4, p. 12, s. 2(a). 
143 U.S., Naval Handbook [1995], ss. 12.7 and 12.7.1. 
144 But see The Falklands Campaign, supra note 4, Para. 250 (post-
war option agreed between Cunard and the Ministry of Defence to 
incorporate „militarily useful features‟ in the ship built to replace the 
SS Atlantic Conveyor, and to conduct subsequent yearly exercises). 
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Humanitarian Law in 1994.145  The San Remo Manual is an up-dated 
restatement on maritime warfare intended to be the modern 
equivalent of the 1913 Oxford Manual,146 is non-binding, and has 
become highly influential on accepted theory and practice.  It required 
six years to draft, numbers 183 paragraphs, and reflects a 
combination of customary and progressive development in 
international law.  The Manual does not deal specifically with the 
conversion of merchant ships into warships, and concentrates 
instead, inter alia, on the necessary precautions to take when 
determining enemy character prior to military attack.  State practice is 
examined in order to formulate clear principles for distinguishing 
between lawful and unlawful military objectives, and the fundamental 
tenets of international humanitarian law applicable alike to land-
based and maritime warfare are specified.   
 
In relation to developments since the 1982 requisition of the 
QE2, the Manual is enlightening.  Auxiliary vessels are defined in 
Paragraph 13 as follows: 
 
[A] vessel, other than a warship, that is owned by or under the 
exclusive control of the armed forces of a State and used for the 
time being on government non-commercial service.147 
 
Paragraph 39 requires the parties to a conflict to distinguish at all 
times between civilians and combatants, and between „civilian or 
                                              
145 L. Doswald-Beck (ed.), San Remo Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (Cambridge:  C.U.P., 1995).  See 
also L. Doswald-Beck, supra note 93, p. 584. 
146 „Introduction‟, San Remo Manual, supra note 145, p. 5. 
147 Paragraph 65:  „… enemy auxiliary vessels … are military objectives 
within the meaning of Paragraph 40‟. 
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exempt objects and military objectives‟,148 a formulation going beyond 
the 1977 Additional Protocol 1, Article 48, in that the latter deals only 
with the protection of civilians and their objects.  Paragraph 40 
defines „military objectives‟ as 
 
[T]hose objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use 
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total 
or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage. 
 
This formulation, too, goes beyond Protocol 1, Article 52, as the 
latter does not deal explicitly with the question of collateral damage 
resulting from attacks directed against military objectives.  The 
Explanation to Paragraph 40 notes that, as civilian objects can lose 
their immunity from attack, a direct connection with combat 
operations is not required.149  Paragraph 41 states that „[m]erchant 
vessels … are civilian objects unless they are military objectives …‟, 
but „[t]he possibility of collateral damage does not as such render an 
attack unlawful‟.150  Paragraph 46 also supplements Protocol 1, Article 
57 (precautions in attack), by requiring „all feasible‟ target information 
and identification in order to avoid or minimise collateral casualties or 
damage.  However, while „a remote advantage to be gained at some 
time in the future is not to be included‟,151 „[a] violation of the rule 
                                              
148 See also U.N.G.A. Resolution 2444 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 
which requires the non-combatant/combatant distinction to be 
respected at all times during an armed conflict. 
149 „Explanation‟, L. Doswald-Beck (ed.), supra note 145, Para. 40.12. 
150 Ibid., Para. 41.1.   
151 Ibid., Para. 46(d). 
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cannot be established if planners and commanders took a decision in 
good faith on the basis of such information‟.152  
 
The San Remo guidelines thus make it increasingly difficult to 
argue that Britain‟s requisition exercise should have been more in 
compliance with Hague Convention VII, as the formal requirements of 
the 1907 Convention appear increasingly irrelevant to modern naval 
warfare.  However, the proportionality principle has been 
strengthened.  In other words, were a belligerent today to consider 
outright destruction of a ship like the QE2, modern practice would 
certainly permit it if the ship were to be deemed a military objective 
capable of affording a concrete military advantage.  However, this 
could have been said about any British ship encountered at sea 
during the war, including the STUFT, and one requisitioned vessel 
was in fact destroyed.153  Nonetheless, even were a war such as that 
which occurred over the Falklands to be re-played today, it remains 
the case that ship destruction is never automatically required and is 
instead only rarely necessary, depending of course on the applicable 
rules of engagement and available target information.154 
 
Conclusion 
 
Modern laws of war owe their development generally to wider societal 
influences which have broadened political accountability for war itself.  
                                              
152 Ibid., Para. 46.3. 
153 The SS Atlantic Conveyor, supra note 144, was struck on 25 May 
and sunk while transporting Harriers, Sea Harriers and Chinook 
helicopters.  See, e.g., „Falkland Islands:  keeping the supply line 
filled‟, supra note 85. 
154 See, e.g., Cmdr. C. Griggs, „Legal Constraints on Maritime 
Operations Affecting Merchant Shipping‟, M.L.A.A.N.Z.J., Vol. 19 
(2005) 148. 
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A central purpose of the conversion formalities found in Hague 
Convention VII was to separate public warships from privateers, and 
thus to formalise conditions for state responsibility regarding the 
potential excesses of economic warfare at sea.  Accordingly, fully-
commissioned warships became the only vessels comprehensively 
authorised to exercise belligerent rights during public war.  
Subsequent instruments made no advance on this essential 
arrangement other than in relation to small details.  The 1977 Geneva 
Protocol 1 was more specific regarding lawful uses of armed force, the 
identification of military objectives, and the principle of 
proportionality.  The 1995 San Remo Manual deals with all questions 
of collateral civilian damage.   
 
British ship requisition in 1982 owed more to the need to 
increase British supply line capabilities than to Hague Convention VII 
conversion formalities.  Indeed, requisition actually only enabled the 
British government to exercise a wider discretion in strategic choice, 
and hence, to secure what it considered to be its territorial integrity.  
However, the main difficulty was that Britain‟s recourse to the Royal 
Prerogative and its own domestic state constitutional arrangements 
for requisition powers produced no binding effect at the international 
level.155  While the minimal cost of requisition in 1982 may no doubt 
have been more important to Britain‟s ability to respond rapidly than 
nice questions of ensigns for use in the freezing murk of the South 
Atlantic, it nonetheless remains the case that as the emergency 
procedures put in place to effect the necessary ship modifications for 
                                              
155 See, e.g., B. Robertson, „Military Intervention in Civil Disturbance 
in Great Britain – What Is the Legal Basis?‟, Revue de Droit Militaire et 
de Droit de la Guerre, Vol. 29/1-2 (1990) 307. 
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war duties, inadequate attention was paid in many cases to more 
global humanitarian concerns such as the principle of distinction.156   
 
The practical usefulness of Hague Convention VII may be nearly 
at an end, yet the recent sale of the QE2 does illustrate one final 
point:  while much „old‟ law such as Hague Convention VII may be 
obsolescent, that is not the same as obsolete, nor does it mean that 
new uses cannot be found.  Convention VII answered needs of its 
time, and still endures despite the demise of war conducted under 
sail.  In 1982, Britain does seem to have complied with Convention VII 
requirements to some extent.  Most importantly, the British 
government was at all times legally and politically responsible for the 
activities of the STUFT, at both domestic and international levels.  It 
would thus appear that the practical and positive contributions long 
made by instruments such as the 1907 Hague Convention VII are still 
of relevance today when the time arrives to balance wartime 
expediencies against the lawful means of human destructiveness.  
  
                                              
156 See, e.g., J. Cockayne, „Regulating Private Military and Security 
Companies:  the Content, Negotiation, Weaknesses and Promise of the 
Montreux Document‟, J.Confl.Sec.L., Vol. 13 (2008) 429. 
